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FOREWORD
This monograph is another in the series of studies
on aspects of Russian defense and foreign policy being
published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). These
monographs derive from a conference that was jointly
sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute; the Ellison
Center for Russian, East European, and Central Asian
Studies at the Jackson School of International Studies
at the University of Washington; the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory’s Pacific Northwest Center for
Global Studies; and the Institute for Global and Regional
Security Studies. This conference, titled “The U.S. and
Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interests,” was
held in Washington, DC, on April 24-26, 2006, and
examined many different regional dimensions of this
bilateral relationship.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the topic of Russian
defense policy has not received great attention. Clearly,
the rebuilding of Russian military strength is a high
priority of President Vladimir Putin, and one to which
he and his subordinates have devoted considerable
time and resources. Therefore, inattention to Russian
defense policy is unwise and even dangerous because
it causes us to overlook potentially major changes not
only in Russian policy, but in international affairs more
generally. Dr. Irina Isakova’s monograph represents an
effort to overcome our neglect and provide readers a
comprehensive account of the defense reform, or what
Moscow calls optimization. It encompasses virtually all
aspects of the reform of the forces, their organizational
structure, the financing of the military, reform of the
defense industrial sector, etc. This topic is both timely
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and particularly relevant and provides a significant
addition to the series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Russian government has demonstrated a
serious intention to address the issue of defense reform
and modernize the military. Russia’s defense reform
is being implemented now, though it is far from being
complete. The pace of the reforms and the sequence of
measures needing to be taken have been adjusted to
the fast-moving political and economic environment.
The present stage of the reform process is a transitional
phase to radical systemic changes in defense posture
planned for 2011-15. It also reflects the political
dynamics of the forthcoming elections in Russia. The
key new developments are:
• Setting clear parameters and timing for radical
Command and Control (C&C) transformation,
including abandoning the Military Districts,
transferring control to the operational commands and strategic “directions” (i.e., strategic
areas) in 2010-15;
• Establishing a joint headquarters for special
purpose forces;
• Reforming military intelligence;
• Adjusting Russia’s new nuclear posture;
• Reforming the defense industry and opening
doors for private investments; and,
• Establishing new forms of civil control over the
military (increasing presidential influence).
Russia’s political establishment, in setting a goal
of reforming the defense system by introducing
transparency, accountability, and civilian control over
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the military, is concentrating its efforts on sustaining
and modernizing nuclear strategic forces and creating
robust counterterrorist special-purpose forces. These
are judged to be the initial and essential tools for
responding to both global and regional/local security
challenges. Training is increasing, changes are being
introduced to command and control and mobilization
policy across the defense and security sectors, and new
weapons systems are coming on line. Modernization
of Russia’s defense and security establishment
is considered to be one of the primary national
development programs. The business community is
expected to join the government’s efforts in funding
this process, especially the procurement programs.
This monograph attempts to describe the framework
and current patterns of Russia’s defense reform.
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RUSSIAN DEFENSE REFORM:
CURRENT TRENDS
INTRODUCTION
The Russian Federation’s (RF) defense reform has
proceeded through different cycles and stages, almost
always under both internal and foreign criticism. Even
in 2006 the debate continues, not only about whether
it has been successful, but also about whether there
is some sort of “road map” in reforming the Russian
military and security services. In the recent past, defense
reform in Russia has lacked the attention it deserves.
Rather, the acute financial and structural problems
that the Russian military was facing—deterioration of
its potential and capabilities, growing crime rates, and
hazing in the military—served as the focus of analysis
and research. Many defense analysts therefore saw the
declared goals and tasks of defense reform as mere
wishful thinking or theoretical exercises. As a result,
new trends in implementing defense reform went
almost unnoticed except for the assessments of a few
military experts.1
Today an assessment of current developments in
Russia’s defense reform once again has become
essential for several reasons. First is the increasing
probability of Russian energy supplies becoming an
integral element of the U.S. energy supply system. As
was revealed in March-April 2006, the U.S. market
is ready to receive up to 10 percent of its supplies of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia. There is even
a possibility of increased LNG deliveries to a level of
30 percent of the U.S. market. The security of energy
supplies thus becomes an important issue for both the
U.S. and Russian defense and security establishments.


The Russian military services, especially the navy,2
have been given new missions in providing security
to offshore installations, platform infrastructure, and
maritime transport routes. Their ability to provide
security in these fields thus becomes important for
their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, the procedures
and rules of engagement (ROE) that could allow joint
U.S.-Russian actions also become part of both states’
security agendas.
Second, the state of Russia’s nuclear posture raises
additional questions about the nature of the strategic
relationship between Russia and the United States. The
article “The Rise of the U.S. Nuclear Primacy” by Keir
A. Lieber and Duryl G. Press in the March 2006 issue of
Foreign Affairs questioned the capability of the Russian
nuclear triad to continue a policy of deterrence, or to
withstand and respond to a U.S. preventive nuclear
strike.3 This article triggered a strong political reaction
in Russia. It inspired a debate among policymakers
and defense experts about the state of Russian nuclear
forces and the nature of the future strategic and nuclear
relationship between the United States and Russia.
Third, the success of Russian defense reforms
will have a direct impact on the results of the 2007
parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections in
Russia. Defense reform affects up to 30-40 percent of
the voting constituency. The decisions taken as part
of its implementation touch those who serve, their
families, and veterans of the Ministry of Defense (MoD)
and other services, not to mention those who consider
themselves to be potential conscripts. Such groups
have a huge stake in the decisions taken in reforming
the mobilization base of the defense establishment.
The preferences of this 30-40 percent of voters could be
crucial in determining the results of the next elections



and the choices the nation will make in defining its
defense direction over the next decade.
Fourth, a restructuring of Russia’s militaryindustrial complex is considered to be an essential
element of defense reform. The creation of vertical
integrated holdings in specialized sectors (aviation,
shipbuilding, information technology, etc.) is regarded
as one of the essential tools for restructuring the defense
industry and for channelling private, including foreign,
investments into the defense sector. The creation of
such holdings presents a dilemma for western and U.S.
companies, i.e., whether to consider the new Russian
corporations as potential partners or competitors. For
instance, United Aviation Construction Corporation
(UACC), one of the proposed aviation holdings
currently being organized, is going to consolidate the
majority of Russian aviation firms and related research
and development (R&D) bureaus in the field. The
product line of Russian Region Jet (RRJ) is going to
be its main core civil project, in which the U.S. Boeing
Corporation is represented substantially. Irkut, one of
the Russian firms that is to participate in the merger,
offered to sell 10-25 percent of its shares to the European
Air Defense System (EADS) prior to completion of the
merger, potentially making EADS an active participant
in the giant Russian aircraft firm UACC. Fulfillment of
such defense reforms, which tend to entangle Russian
defense-related industries with those of the West, have
enormous political, economic, defense, and strategic
implications for U.S. companies. The implementation
of new regulations for investment in the defense
sector in Russia thus creates additional challenges and
opportunities for the U.S. firms.
Fifth, implementation of defense reform creates
new patterns of civil-military control, revealing the



patterns of Russia’s understandings of transparency,
accountability, etc. Sixth, and finally, the proposed
patterns of the modernization of the armed forces and
defense reform in general demonstrate with whom
and how the U.S. military can better communicate and
cooperate with the Russian armed forces in order to
address jointly new security challenges.
The basis of the current reform effort was
established in the late 1990s. By the end of 2003, there
was an increasing number of reports that the Russian
military had emerged from the “crisis of survival”
and was entering a stage of systemic development.
The latest version of military reform (2004-08) is being
implemented now, at least in part. Professionalization
of the military continues, although at a slow pace and
with some setbacks; and the goal to provide the armed
forces with high-tech equipment and the capability to
use it has begun to be realized.
Military reform is supposed to touch the structural
elements of the military (reorganization of the General
Staff in the Ministry of Defense and introduction of new
principles of military command and control); reduction
in numerical strength; initiation of a transfer from
reservist mobilization principles to a system of contract
service;4 implementation of security sector reform,
with emphasis on counterterrorism; and achievement
of an overall modernization of the defense technical
base. Despite inconsistencies in implementation of its
original designs, Russian military reform has a road
map. Its goal is to realize the transition of archaic,
inefficient defense machinery to a new-generation
defense posture, capable of addressing the whole
complex of contemporary challenges. Neither of these
goals has been reached, but in each area a number of
steps to introduce systemic changes have taken place.



Currently the focus of defense reform is:
• New command and control principles;
• Mobilization system;
• Modernization and rearmament;
• Security sector reform (with special focus on
counterterrorism measures); and,
• New forms of civil control over the military.
Preservation of nuclear deterrence is also considered
to be an essential element of—in fact, an absolute
requisite for—defense reform.
Defense reform in the RF was a long-awaited
necessity. It was needed to deal with the internal
requirements of military organizations, to address
needed changes in response to internal strategic
transformations of society and its administrative
management system, as well as to current challenges
posed by the spread of international terrorist threats.5
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT:
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Russian military is undergoing radical
changes in command and control procedures and
structures. Present innovations could be considered
as a provisional phase, testing the best mechanisms
for transferring defense machinery from the Military
District structures to regional commands and strategic
“directions” or areas. The process is to be completed in
2011-15.6
Initial Design.
The federal program, embodied in a document
titled “On operational readiness of the territory of


the Russian Federation for the purposes of defense
until 2025,” prepared by the General Staff, received
the support of the Ministry of Finance, the State Legal
Department of the Presidential Administration, and all
subjects of the Russian Federation. It also was certified
by the RF Ministry of Justice and was submitted to the
Government for its approval.7 This document brought
together military planning within Russia’s Federal
Districts (FD) and programs of social-economic
developments in the regions.
The new administrative structure of the state is
linked directly with the future of military reform, which
is to be implemented on the basis of the universally
integrated “effectiveness-cost-feasibility” model. It is
also linked to the reform of the established strategic
commands, operational task forces (OTF), and joint
logistics, which are considered essential elements of
new cost-effective approaches to defense and security.
Two types of conflicts are envisioned:
• Local/regional/global conflicts with regular
armies (international interstate conflicts).
• Local/regional conflicts with irregular military
formations (intrastate conflicts), separatist
movements, and criminal groups, bandit
formations, and terrorist insurgencies. These
types of conflicts could be purely internal and
focused on anticrime, antiterrorism, and actions
to reestablish a constitutional order. They could
also occur outside the borders of the state (on the
territory of the Commonwealth of Independent
States [CIS]) or be classified as cross-border
conflicts.
Depending on the type and nature of the conflict,
the objectives assigned to these task forces differ


among themselves. The task forces’ goals and mission
determine the structure of the unit and its functions.
The concept of the “task force” was legitimized in the
Federal Law, On Defense (1996), where it was stressed
that joint efforts and coordination among different
forces such as those of the Ministry of Defense (MoD),
Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Emergency
Situations and Civil Defense (MChS), Federal
Border Troop Service (FBTS), Russian Electronic and
Communications Intelligence (FAPSI), and the Federal
Security Service (FSB) would be essential in fighting
against enemy special forces, airborne troops, and
criminal elements, and in guarding and defending
communications, military installations, and vital
economic and state facilities. The task force concept
was confirmed in the RF Military Doctrine (2000) as a
basic organizational and combat formation design to
be used in an internal conflict (Article 5, No. 6) and in
national defense against external threats (Article 13).
Cooperation and coordination of the task forces
depend on harmonizing the demarcation zones between the military and other force structures. Before the
Concept of State Policy on Military Development of Russia
until the Year 2005 was approved in early August 1998,
there were different types of overlapping demarcation
zones for the MoD and other force structures. In 1998
there were eight military districts and four fleets, seven
districts of the MoI, six FBTS districts and nine regional
centers of the MChS. The Concept of Military Reform
established a single system of military-administrative
division of Russian territory into strategic directions.8
This harmonization of security space was aimed at
overcoming the disunity of the various defense-related
entities operating in a common area. In a situation
of grave financial shortages, it was also designed to



unify the mobilization reserves, technical support,
procurement policies, and logistics, and to coordinate
command and control functions within the mentioned
strategic directions.
Abandoning the duplicative functions of services
and infrastructures was also considered to be a prime
task of defense reform. As was stated by President
Putin at the RF Security Council meeting in November
2000, “Keeping duplicating military structures does
not help the country’s defense and damages the armed
forces.”9
The RF Military Doctrine of 2000 (Article 22) defines
the functions of the Operational Strategic Commands
as follows: Command and control by the on-scene
commander includes command over the interservice
groups of general purpose forces, as well as planning
and organizing joint activities with other military units,
formations, and institutions responsible for military
security within the boundaries of their responsibilities
and the unified system of military-administrative
demarcation of the territory of the RF.10
Setting the Parameters.
On January 25, 2006, the Defense Ministry’s
newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, published an article on
Russia’s military policy by Chief of Staff of the Russian
Armed Forces Army General Yury Baluyevsky, who
reported on the dramatic upcoming changes in the
military structure of the army and navy. These include
the transformation of current military districts into
“operational and strategic directions”; restructuring
of divisions and armies into more flexible military
units with enhanced maneuverability; and formation
of task forces. Task forces already are operating in the



Kaliningrad Region, now a “special district,” and on
the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Moreover, the General Staff has been testing the
operation of task forces at the brigade-to-corps levels
in the Leningrad Military District since January 2006.
In 2005-07, an experiment on practical implementation
of the transfer of the command and control functions
to strategic directions and establishment of functioning
regional headquarters task forces of the united services
began. The experiment is to be completed by 2007,
with recommendations on the best practices for the
subsequent transition period.11
It was reported that the transition to the strategic
directions and task forces is to start only after the
results of the experiments are obtained and analyzed,
sometime between 2008 and 2010. The political
decision on the transfer was made, according to the
Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, at the RF Security
Council meeting on July 9, 2005.12 After the institutional
status of the General Staff was downgraded in 2004,
its main attention was focused primarily on such
traditional functions as threat evaluation, development
of theoretical doctrinal concepts, planning, and
strategy. Any public statements coming from the Chief
of the General Staff therefore should now be seen as
a declaration of policy adopted and approved by the
political-military authorities at the highest levels.
In addition, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said,
on the record, that there were no plans to make any
serious changes in Russia’s military structure until the
year 2010. This statement was intended to set a proper
time schedule for transition. Instead, it confused some
defense experts, who assumed that current Russian
defense reform was only a minor adjustment13 rather
than a radical transformation of the entire Russian
defense establishment.14


The Presidential address to the Federal Assembly
on May 10, 2006, confirmed the plans for radical
transformation of the defense posture. News media
sources connected with the government went further by
citing the decisions of the MoD Collegium (April 2006)
and explaining the main parameters for command and
control reform:15
• The existing six Military Districts and four
fleets are to be transformed into three Regional
Commands—West European (West), Central
Asian (South), and Far Eastern (East)—based
on integrated command and control of ground
and naval forces located in the current Military
Districts.
• As part of the reform, the commanding officer
will be in charge of all services and military
defense formations, with the exception
of Strategic Nuclear Missile Forces. The
commanding officer is to be responsible for
territorial defense in cases of terrorist attacks
and/or local/regional conflicts.
• The Air Force is to merge with the Strategic
Missile Forces and Space Forces.
• Airborne troops are to be subordinated to the
Main Ground Forces HQ.
• A joint logistic and procurement system is to be
established for all defense/security services.
The MoD Collegium approved a plan of transformation
of the command and control structure proposed by
the General Staff. The transformation is expected
to be completed between 2011 and 2015. It has been
suggested by some defense experts that the proposed
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command and control system partly resembles that of
the United States.
JOINT LOGISTICS
Setting up a unified logistic system is also an
essential part of the optimization or reform of the
defense/security infrastructure. The Armed Forces
Logistic Support Service is being streamlined so as to
better accord with the country’s economic capabilities.16
Ivanov, soon after being appointed Minister of Defense
in 2001, wrote in Krasnaya Zvezda that there would
be a “rationalization of logistics” as part of military
reform.17 Services such as warehousing, transport,
and healthcare for both the army and the paramilitary
forces answerable to the Interior Ministry would be
integrated under a single command in each military
district.18 As was stated in the Ministry’s White Paper
on Defense presented in October 2003, among the goals
and tasks of military reform was to speed up the
unification of logistic support and technical assistance
of the military and other services.19
This process meant establishment of a unified
logistic system for the military and other services within
seven federal districts. The system was an essential and
basic element of the optimization of the Armed Forces
and became a principal plank in reforming the military
system. The unified logistics system presupposed
certain changes in the military system itself:
• Optimization of the command and control
system and elimination of duplication of
command structures in the regions.
• Unification of procurement orders for the
military and other forces.
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• Merger of medical, infrastructure support,
and transportation systems that would lead to
significant reductions in personnel.
• Introduction of a territorial system of recruit induction within the boundaries of the administrative districts.
Among the goals and tasks of military reform was
that of speeding up unification of the logistics support
and technical assistance facilities of the military and
other services. Some of these goals now are being
addressed.
UNIFICATION OF THE PROCUREMENT REGIME
In 2005-06 a new mechanism for commissioning
procurement projects and monitoring their delivery
was introduced. In order to make more efficient use of
funds, members of Parliament recommended in 2004
that the government re-create a Ministry of Defense
Industries. In 2005 some steps were taken in this
direction by the RF executive branch when the Federal
Service on State Order and Federal Military Technical
Service were created within the RF MoD. In March 2006,
a decision was made to create a Military-Industrial
Commission (MIC) to centralize and strengthen the
operational management of the military-industrial
complex and act as a new state institution for unified
supply and equipment procurement for all “power
ministries,” with the MoD having the leading role.20
The MIC was established formally as a permanently
functioning institution within the RF government
on March 20, 2006. Minister of Defense Ivanov was
appointed immediately to lead the MIC.
On March 21, 2006, President Putin named
Vladislav Putilin, former director of the Defense and
12

Security Programs Department at the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade, as deputy head of
the Military-Industrial Commission with ministerial
status.21 The MIC’s status, parameters, and duties were
not defined and announced by the government until
late April 2006. It was given responsibility for overseeing long-term strategy and planning and performing
operational management of R&D procurement
projects; introducing a strict monitoring mechanism on
pricing of defense projects; and monitoring the overall
restructuring of the military-industrial complex.
In the RF 80 percent of the arms and defense
systems are produced by monopoly producers. The
MIC is authorized to prevent creation of monopolies
of producers and R&D in the internal market by
stimulating competition between the enterprises in
production of spare parts, but eliminating competition
during the production stage of the completed item.22 The
MIC also defines the main parameters for state defense
orders, including timing, pricing, and personnel policy
in the defense enterprises.
Other officials assigned to the Commission besides
Ivanov and Putilin are the head of the General Staff
Army General Yury Baluevsky; Minister of Economic
Development and Trade German Gref; Minister of
Finances Alexei Kudrin; Minister of Industry and
Energy Victor Khristenko; head of Rosprom Boris
Aleshin; head of Rosatom Sergei Kirienko; head of
Roscosmos Anatoly Perminov; General Director of
Rosoboronexport Sergei Chemezov; and Director of the
Administrative Department in the RF Government
Mikhail Lychagin. Igor Borovkov, the first deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy and director of the
Department of Defense Industry and Information
Technology in the RF Government, was appointed
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as the Chief of Staff of the Commission, with wide
responsibilities for framing the Commission’s decisions
and monitoring their implementation. In addition,
there are several permanent staff members assigned
to monitor and oversee specific sectors of the defense
industry. These members of the staff were ordered to
leave their previous posts and concentrate full time on
their new responsibilities. They are:
• Alexander Goev, Director of the Krasnogorsk
Optical Mechanical Plant, who was made
responsible for weapons/weapon systems and
platforms for the Ground Forces;
• Vladimir Pospelov, Vice president of the State
Center of Nuclear Shipbuilding (Severodvinsk)
and former head of the Rossudostroeniye (Russian
vessel building), who was made responsible for
the navy procurement programs.23
• Alexander Bobryshev, General Director of Novosibirsk Chkalov Aviaproduction Corporation,
who monitors aviation and space programs.24
Joint Logistics and Command and Control
in Procurement Policies.
A joint approach for logistic support and procurement is to be implemented with the help of a joint
civil agency dealing with the procurement programs
for all defense and security services and agencies.
The Civil Agency for procurement and outsourcing
of arms and military equipment is scheduled to
become operational in 2007. By the end of this year,
the government promised to establish a joint system
of procurement for all state defense orders and for all
services.25 In November 2005, in order to stimulate this
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process, Ivanov was appointed First Deputy Prime
Minister with an expanding portfolio, which included
implementation of the military-technical policy,
as well as formulation and execution of the State
Defense Order; restructuring the military-industrial
complex; overseeing the nuclear, space, and missile
industries; and exercising responsibility over the
export control regime and dual-use technologies with
a view to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
Some Russian experts have suggested that the Federal Defense Order Service26 could well be removed
from the MoD and placed under Ivanov’s direct
supervision as first deputy prime minister. The main
purpose would be more complete and energetic
compliance with the transformation of the defense
industry and establishment of a civilian joint
procurement agency, which would act on behalf of all
services/defense communities.27 However, the leading
role of the MoD in the oversight of procurement policies
is apparently to remain unchallenged.
Special Forces and Intelligence.
Streamlining command and control procedures
has affected the highly sensitive spheres of defense
organization as much as it did the intelligence
networks and special purpose forces. In accordance
with the “Plan of Military Construction for 2006-10”
and in line with a decision of the RF Security Council
(March 2005), a unified command headquarters for
Special Purpose Forces is to be established, directly
subordinated to the President. This arrangement
allows the Russian President to make decisions on their
deployment (outside the country, in case of necessity,
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to counteract terrorist threats) without approval of
the RF parliament. The state budget, according to the
news media, has a separate provision in the 2006 fiscal
year to cover such measures. These developments
can be considered revolutionary. The main principle
for establishing a new military service takes into
consideration not only the technical characteristics
of any military hardware used, but also the possible
missions, particularly those involving worldwide
special operations such as antiterrorist operations. The
overall training and monitoring of all special forces,
it was reported, are to be transferred to the Main
Intelligence Directorate (General Staff) by June 2006.28
These units are going to be engaged mostly with the
Western Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) in North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/European
Union (EU) operations, together with peacekeeping
units serving under other international organizations.
This measure was advertised as a step to allow the
Russian MoD to respond more directly and efficiently
to small-scale conflicts, to neutralize nonstate actors,
and to counter nonmilitary threats in cooperation with
security services and police units.
The centralization drive and optimization process
is also affecting military intelligence, as widely
reported in the Russian press in early April 2006.
According to General Baluevsky, the goal of such
reform was “making a more efficient system of military
intelligence, better equipping intelligence units in the
services, and stepping up the process of centralization
and planning under the General Staff.”29 The changes
mean that the Intelligence Directorates of the Air
Force, Navy, and Ground forces are to be dissolved,
with army intelligence units subordinate to the Main
Intelligence Directorate and responding directly to
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it. The Intelligence Directorates of the services are
to be transformed into departments with less staff,
allowing the ministry to cut personnel from 20 to 6
persons; new units are to be headed by officers at the
rank of colonel instead of lieutenant general as was
formerly the case.30 Under the previous system, the
regional directorates were responsible for the training
of special forces units.31 Thus, according to Russian
Duma member and ex-Deputy Minister of Defense
Andrey Kokoshin, Russia is in the process of forming
a completely different military triad: strategic forces
(with traditional elements of strategic missile, navy,
and aviation forces); conventional forces (consisting of
ground and nonstrategic navy and air components);
and special antiterrorist forces.32
Antiterrorist Network/Security Sector Reform.
Command and control reform entails the introduction of “changes not only in the armed forces,
but in all elements of the defense organization of the
state that should be capable of effectively providing
self-defense in any developing circumstances of the
international situation.”33 On December 15, 2002,
it was announced that the Russian Prime Minister
approved appointments to the Federal Antiterrorist
Commission and signed the order on the Status of
the Commission. The nominations confirmed the
establishment of a permanent institutional body that
was to act as a center for coordination of the security,
border guard services, and militia (police) on a
regular basis, including emergencies. This decision
entailed establishment of a new coordination system
for antiterrorist security. The Commission was made
responsible for formulating the RF antiterrorist strategy
and tactics; coordinating the actions of the ministries,
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services, and executive authorities at all levels aimed
at neutralization and prevention of terrorist attacks,
as well as for addressing the conditions that promote
them. The Commission was also made responsible for
initiating and introducing antiterrorist legislation. The
decisions made by the Commission are binding on all
federal executive institutions, executive authorities
of all subjects of the Russian Federation, regional
antiterrorist commissions, and all organizations of the
RF.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) provides operational management and logistic support. Information
support and policy assessments are provided by all
federal ministries, agencies, and services represented
on the Commission and the authorities involved
in any potential terrorist incident on a case-bycase basis. As former Minister of Interior General
Kulikov pointed out, the difference between the new
system and the 2002 arrangement so far as security
counterintelligence operations were concerned lay in
more efficient procedures and a clearer division of
functions. Both the President and Prime Minister are
the approval authorities for overall operational plans,
but operational implementation is left to the specific
services.34 The roles of the FSB and Ministry of Interior
as the main players in the Commission were confirmed
by the then Prime Minister’s decision No. 2149. The
urgent need to address the terrorist threat brought
about the increasing influence of the security services.
The trend has intensified since 2003, as the FSB became
de facto a leading “senior service,” as it was called by
Dmitri Trenin, senior defense and security expert from
Carnegie Center, Moscow. As a result, the hierarchy
of responsibilities and subordination was adjusted to
reflect the growing importance and prominence of the
antiterrorist apparatus.
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The National Antiterrorist Committee (the NAC,
functioning under the FSB directorship) was created
by Presidential decree in February 2006. A Federal
Operational Headquarters for the NAC is headed by
Nikolay Patrushev, double-hatted as chairman of the
NAC and head of the FSB. Parallel headquarters for
NAC activities were established at lower echelons of
the Russian Federation. Heads of all headquarters and
staff appointments were nominated. The staff of the
NAC is part of the FSB. Other officials assigned to the
Federal Headquarters are Minister of Interior Rashid
Nurgaliev (deputy head of the Federal Headquarters);
Deputy Minister of the Federal Security Service and
Chief of Staff of NAC Vladimir Bulavin (deputy head
of the Federal Headquarters); First Deputy Prime
Minister Sergei Ivanov; Head of the Ministry of
Emergencies and Civil Defense Sergei Shoigu; Minister
of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov; Director of the Foreign
Intelligence Service Sergei Lebedev; Director of the
Federal Protection Service of Russia Yevgeny Murov;
Head of Rosfinmonitoring Viktor Zubkov; Deputy
Head of the Security Council R. F. Valentin Sobolev,
etc.35
According to the International Institute of
Strategic Studies publication, Military Balance 200506, among members of the NAC are also the Deputy
Head of the Presidential Administration; the Deputy
Chairman of the Federation Council; one member of
the State Duma; the Minister for Health and Social
Development; the Minister for Information Technology
and Communications; the Minister for Transport; the
Minister of Justice; the Director of the Federal Guard
Service; and the Head of the Federal Monitoring
Service.36
The NAC focuses on coordinating the work
of emergency forces in the seven federal districts,
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which are responsible for monitoring all elements of
the executive institutions in case of an emergency.
For instance, the NAC is in charge of coordinating
the territorial organizations of the federal executive
power institutions, regional power structures of
the RF subjects, and local authorities in preventive
measures against terrorism. It is expected to minimize
the impact of terrorist actions and coordinate activities
of the civil institutions after any terrorist attack.
Practical planning, coordination, and execution of the
operations in post-attack periods are under the direct
supervision of the NAC.37 At the first NAC meeting, the
following organizations were represented: the National
Antiterrorist Committee; seven Federal Districts (at the
status of Presidental Envoy); the Military Districts; the
Directorates of the MoI in the Federal Districts; and the
Security Services in the Federal Districts. In cases where
emergency rule is invoked, the NAC has a network that
could be used effectively for direct governance of any
region or group of the Federation and for coordination
and monitoring of political and economic activities.38
In addition, the presidential team took steps to
tighten control over personnel policies in the security
services. On December 27, 2005, President Putin signed
amendments to Articles 4 and 6 of the Federal Law,
On Defense, intended to harmonize the main document
with the changes introduced to the federal laws On
the FSS (FSB) (Article 16) and On the Federal Protection
Service (Article 18), which expanded the authority of the
President. These amendments granted sole authority
to the President for deciding the numerical strength
of military personnel and civilian employees of both
the FSB and Federal Protection Service. An affirmative
decision on the amendments was voted by the State
Duma on December 9, 2005, and by the Federation
Council on December 14, 2005.39
20

MOBILIZATION/PROFESSIONALIZATION
Resolution of personnel issues also continues to be
among the priorities of defense reform. Presently there
are 1,134,000 servicemen in the RF armed forces. During
the last 5 years, as part of the optimization process,
200,000 servicemen became excess. By January 1, 2011,
another 34,000 servicemen are expected to retire or be
dismissed. The stated official goal is to have 1,013,000
servicemen by 2011. However, it was promised by the
Minister of Defense that no personnel from combat
units will be declared excess. Only the supporting staff,
together with posts in the high-ranking officers’ levels
(generals), are to face personnel cuts.40
The mobilization base for defense is shrinking, and
the quality of draftees has declined considerably. The
dynamic is striking: in 1994 about 25 out of 100 young
men were drafted; in 2005-06, only 9 out of 100 young
men of eligible age have been drafted into service.
According to the Military Balance 2005-06, in 2004 and
2005, an increasing percentage of eligible conscripts
were found to be physically or mentally unfit for
service and had to be discharged. From 2006, Russia
will be entering a stage of “considerable reduction
in the working population.” In 2006, Russia’s labor
resources could be reduced by 30,000 people; in 2007,
the number is expected to go down by 370,000, and by
538,000 in 2008.41
These are going to be gap years for induction, as the
percentage of those eligible to be drafted is expected to
drop considerably as well. The analysis demonstrated
that there was no intention to replace the conscriptionbased forces totally with a professional army in the
immediate future. However, plans were made to
proceed with the introduction of service by contract,
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making it more manageable and legally binding, with
a step-by-step introduction of service by contract of
additional specialized categories of servicemen and
draftees.
Professional Armed Forces.
Formally, the professionalization experiment
started in 2004 and is supposed to produce results by
the end of 2007. Full professionalization at unit level
remains a target which will apply first to the airborne
forces and formations designated for operations in the
areas of conflict. Main contingents of the airborne forces
are to be transferred to service by contract by 2007.
According to the official statistics, there are several
units that already have become fully professional,
such as the 76th Airborne Division in Pskov and the
31st Airborne Brigade and 42nd Motor Rifle Division
deployed in Chechnya. The 98th Airborne Division in
Ivanovo is to become fully professional by June 1, 2006
(more than 6 months ahead of schedule). The 106th
Airborne Division is to become partly professionalized,
with draftees and volunteer servicemen combined.
The 21st Airborne Battalion in Ulyanovsk is waiting
to start transformation by 2007.42 Naval crews were
named as the second tier priority of forces selected to
be transferred to contracts.43 The drive to transfer the
majority of the services to contracts also has affected
the MoI, Border Guards, etc. There are comprehensive
transformations now taking place in the MoI’s units
and the special forces.
However, there already are several emergent
problems with the process of professionalization
of the armed forces and other services. First is the
difficulty in adhering to the time schedule or annual
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targets for getting young men to enroll in military
service on contract. There is an unresolved dispute
between the Minister of Defense and MoD staff in their
assessments of the time frame needed to achieve the
proclaimed goals. According to the public statement
of the Minister of Defense, the MoD has to have 130140 thousand contracted servicemen, or 50 percent
of all army personnel, as professional forces by 2007.
Judging by the MoD’s assessment, however, it would
be difficult to reach this target by 2007. By the year
2007, it is intended to have cut conscription from a 2year to 1-year period of service and to have reduced
the period of alternative service from 42 months to
18. But the number of those volunteering for contract
service is not meeting annual targets. For instance, in
2004 the number of those registered for contract service
in the Moscow Military District was only 17 percent of
the targeted figure; in the North Caucasus, 45 percent;
in the Volga-Urals, 25 percent.44 Presently there are
109,000 sergeants serving under the MoD, but only
23,000 are under contract.
Second, the MoD is faced with the problem of
keeping up to numerical strength those regiments
that already have been transferred to contract service.
Moreover, according to the Military Prosecution Office,
an increasing number of contracted servicemen from
the aforementioned units have been relieved of duties
for drunkenness and violence. Also, there has been an
increasing tendency for soldiers serving under contract
to fail to return for duty after vacation.
Third, double-booking has been occurring, as when
contracted servicemen were induced to re-register in
particular other regiments or units in order to serve
the government’s ulterior purposes. For instance,
1,000 servicemen from the 42nd Motor Rifle Division
deployed in Chechnya were induced to re-register
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with the 46th Motor Rifle Division slated to take over
in Chechnya from the 42nd, thus conveniently keeping
them deployed in the region.45
Financial and organizational difficulties are
allegedly among the reasons for these problems. There
are almost no financial incentives to join the service
by contract. Irregular payment and low salaries in
comparison with the civilian sector are the rule. (The
contracted soldier’s monthly salary is about 5,000-6,000
rubles if he serves locally, and about 15,000 rubles if
he is sent to a conflict area.) The low pay was among
the reasons named for why over 2,000 volunteers
quit the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, according to
Komsomolskaya pravda.46 In addition, the standard of
living of servicemen deteriorated considerably with the
cancellation of the traditional social benefits to them as
part of the national social and economic reforms that
were introduced in 2004-05.
The absence of professionally trained noncommissioned and junior officers, who are most responsible
for the educational development, morale, and ethnic
assimilation of servicemen, also contributed to
deteriorating professionalism in the units. Failure
to make sufficient provision for a professional corps
of noncommissioned officers is considered a huge
deficiency of the reform process, one which could in
the long term result in the de facto metamorphosis of
the enlisted ranks into a band of unreliable mercenaries
rather than a professional army. In 2005-06, the MoD
tried to improve the situation through several policy
decisions:
• The MoD sought legislation to introduce
stricter rules for application to those who fail to
comply with the terms of contracts. Presently
the amendments to the federal laws regulating
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this issue are being debated in the Russian
parliament.
• The Ministry is supporting creation of military
centers in civil universities and colleges for
promotion of professional military service.
• The MoD has introduced a new clause in the
contract for those receiving military education.
If, after graduation from a military college or
institute, the serviceman decides to leave the
armed forces and work in the civilian sector,
the graduate has to pay the full cost for his/her
education after discharge.
• As an indirect financial incentive to boost service
by contract as well as to increase the number
of serving officers, the MoD has introduced a
program of liberal home mortgage benefits.
They are given to those who join the service in
or after 2005 and are planning to serve in the
military for no less than 20 years.
• The MoD has decided to introduce contracted
sergeants in the RF army as the intermediate
leaders between soldiers and commissioned
officers. They are to be responsible for training
and education of the conscripts. On May 26,
2006, at the session of the State Duma on defense
reform implementation, Minister of Defense
Ivanov confirmed that the MoD was working on
transferring the positions of sergeants and petty
officers, as well as aircraft and ship crewmen, to
contract service. If the present plans for military
modernization are to succeed, an additional
26,000 sergeants on contract could be serving in
the RF armed forces eventually. The changes are
intended not only to combat hazing and crime
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within military ranks, but also to provide the
necessary conditions for professionalizing the
military. Thus, the sergeant augmentation was
not just a reaction to public condemnation of the
publicized hazing incidents, but rather a reasoned necessity for that aspect of defense reform
calling for true military professionalism.
Enhancing the Draft System.
On May 10, 2006, President Putin confirmed that no
shift to an all-volunteer force was envisaged. Thus the
draft system, strongly defended by the top brass, will
remain in place despite mounting public objections. In
order to deal with the numerous challenges to effective
mobilization, the MoD undertook measures, on the one
hand, to increase the mobilization base for conscription,
and on the other to upgrade the quality of those called
to join the armed forces. In 2005-06, several new policies
were tested. For example, the MoD is taking steps to
improve the draft registration process, one aim being
to reverse the decline in the annual harvest of draftees.
Several measures were introduced:
• Until recently, there was a set of legal deferments
allowing draftees to evade a draft call. The MoD
has proposed, the Government supported, and
the Parliament is in the process of approving,
the suspension of nine types of deferment,
leaving the remaining ones untouched. No
longer will “delays” be given to young fathers,
medical professionals working in rural areas
and regions, graduates of naval colleges and
academies, graduates of academies of art, civil
servants (including those registered to run for
the legislative bodies), and employees of defense
enterprises.
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• At the same time, the MoD is promoting
reduction of the term of mandatory military
service. By 2007, the term of service is to be
reduced from 2 years to 1.5 years; and by 2008 to
1 year. Moreover, a new interpretation is being
applied to “alternative service.” Previously
those applying for alternative service in lieu of
serving in active military units could invoke only
their religious/pacifist beliefs as justification.
However, if new amendments are adopted,
any compelling explanation for such a request
in written form, whether based on religious/
philosophical convictions or not, should be
sufficient for consideration. However, the MoD
opposes allowing service in the police (militia) or
fire service to count as an alternative to military
duty. The term of alternative military service is
to be reduced as well, from 3 years to 1.5 years
by 2008. This reduction is to be accomplished
in parallel with the term reduction for active
military duty. Another liberalization of
alternative service being proposed is elimination
of residency restrictions, thus permitting
alternative duty in the part of the RF where the
conscript permanently resides.
• Another point addressed was the alleged
ineffective work of military district commissariats, as reflected in their inability to enforce
a call-up of young men of draft age. The RF
government therefore introduced plans to
reform the national system of military district
commissariats, with the officers in charge
now to be rotated after 3-year terms. Over 600
commissariats, generally those covering larger
territories, are to be closed or merged. The 3-year
rotation in the recruitment centers is intended
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to reduce corruption among the officers (e.g.,
bribes in exchange for deferments) and thus
increase the number of those inducted into the
service.
• The officers from the reserve centers are to be
either placed within the regular mobilization
orbit or transferred to active military units.
These innovations are to be introduced in 2006.
In responding to military district commissariat
complaints about the absence of financial
assistance to promote contract service, the MoD
initiated a 24-hour-a-day RV/TV service. The
program “Star” (Zvezda) could be heard and
viewed in 58 regions of the RF, thus hopefully
covering the “propaganda” gap. Among its goals
are enhancement of military service’s image
and promoting the benefits of contract service.
Patriotic education is becoming an important
element of the public relations and news media
work of the MoD and other services.
• The MoD has proposed a series of programs
to resolve health-related problems and low
educational levels of draftee contingents. The
MoD has introduced a system of rigorous
medical screening of young men eligible for
the service. Hospitals henceforth are required
to send medical data of potential draftees to
the military district commissariats throughout
the year. Thus, the disqualification of a draftee
on medical grounds is to become much more
difficult to fake. Special military training and
education courses are to be reinstated in the
secondary schools to upgrade physical fitness
and the educational and professional levels of

28

potential draftees. Special training programs are
being introduced in the military commissariats
to provide physical training for future
conscripts.
All these changes have long-term goals aimed
at addressing not only demographic loopholes in
recruitment, but also the profound reductions in the
quality of military recruits. Until recently, the armed
forces mostly drafted reserves with working class
backgrounds from industrial estates and rural areas.
This imbalance was a deficiency since the recruitment
pool ought to be “socially balanced” and, most
importantly, “better ready for new generation
equipment and new military tasks.” The military
would like to upgrade the educational level of all
recruits. Special attention is being given to the new
generation of recruits in view of the important
procurement programs being implemented by 200810. In the year 2000 assessments, qualitative changes in
the mobilization base were targeted for achievement by
2010. According to the most current public statements
by authorities, the timing of mobilization reform
has been advanced by 2 years; reform is expected
to be completed by 2008. Meanwhile, the closing
of deferment loopholes is supposed to provide the
military with more boots on the ground, obtaining
recruits, first of all, from the regions with higher-thanaverage unemployment among young men, as well as
rural areas. The selection process is intended to ease
social tensions while preserving recruitment potential
from higher educational backgrounds for future
mobilization campaigns.
As a demonstration of the armed forces’ transformation, the MoD is introducing new regulations that reflect
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the practical realities of operating within a complex
combined (professional and conscript) mobilization
system. Presently only the Drill (Operational) Manual,
which takes into account the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) for the service under contract, has been submitted
to the units. Within a few months, however, the MoD
and MoI are planning to provide the armed forces with
several new manuals addressing disciplinary issues,
guard and garrison duty, home affairs service (MoI
only), etc.47
MODERNIZATION AND REARMAMENT
The focus of its procurement programs confirms
that the political and military leadership sees its main
tasks to be sustainment of nuclear deterrence as a
political/military tool and obtaining the capability to
wage counterterrorist/special operations domestically
or internationally, as part of cooperation with the
West (CJTFs, NATO, EU, CIS), etc., or against internal
instabilities. Moscow is redefining its national priority
interests by focusing its attention on rebuilding and
reforming the country’s defense and security systems.
Engaging the business community in the restructuring
plans is seen as one of the main elements of the
program’s success. The priority focus is on nuclear
deterrence and counterterrorism.
The government has announced a policy of selected
and targeted state investments in defense/security
procurement programs. The procurement program
has three main elements: (1) nuclear strategic forces;
(2) equipment for permanent/readiness units; and
(3) equipment for units engaged in counterterrorist
operations.
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Strategic Nuclear Deterrence.
Moscow is investing heavily in strategic nuclear
forces and special operations forces until it can
reform its conventional military. The focus is on the
nuclear triad (strategic air, naval, and ground forces)
for sustaining nuclear deterrence. Though publicly
and officially Moscow has confirmed its interest in
preserving the nuclear triad, the currently existing
programs concentrate mainly on the modernization
of naval and ground-based nuclear strategic forces by
2015-20. The RF constantly reiterates its continuing
intent to preserve nuclear deterrence. On March 30,
2006, President Putin, addressing a special meeting
on the military nuclear complex, said that “analysis of
the current international environment and prospective
trends of its development determines that Russia
should consider nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone
of its policy, to guarantee its national security and the
safety of its nuclear weapons complex.”48
Russia was and is consistent in promoting minimum
deterrence. In 2005 and 2006, Russia’s Minister of
Defense confirmed the attainment of a level of adequate
sufficiency in strategic nuclear defense as a priority
state policy. In comparison with that of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Russian nuclear
potential is considerably less: 39 percent fewer strategic
bombers, 58 percent fewer intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), and 80 percent fewer submarines
with ballistic missiles.49 But the remaining potential
is still enough to sustain the policy of minimum
deterrence. Major General Vladimir Vasilenko, head
of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry
of Defense (which is responsible for strategic nuclear
planning), pointed out in February 2006 that “reductions
of missiles in the Strategic Deterrence Forces during
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the last years did not affect their ability to carry on the
task of strategic deterrence.”50
At the same time, Moscow introduced changes in
its criterion for assessing the sufficiency of deterrence.
Parity of nuclear weapons has become an insufficient
criterion for the strategic nuclear components. The
new criterion for sufficiency is based on the capability
of nuclear forces to penetrate the enemy’s national
missile defense.
A new posture could be announced by the end of
2006 or even sooner. According to Yury Solomonov,
head and chief missile designer at the Moscow Institute
of Thermal Technology (MITT), the main research
institute for the designing of ground- and sea-launched
nuclear missiles, Russia could announce planned
changes in its strategic nuclear capability by the end
of the year.51 Although official details are not available
yet, there have been several public statements pointing
to the following essential characteristics:
• Balance, but not parity;
• Minimal deterrence;
• Asymmetric response;
• Return of MIRVs; and,
• Russia’s possible unilateral withdrawal from
the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty as
a response to similar U.S. actions.
General Yury Baluyevskiy, Chief of the General
Staff, hinted that Russia was giving up the principle
of symmetry, that is, an all-out effort to preserve
quantitative parity with the potential enemy. It also
will develop its armed forces asymmetrically, shaping
priorities that will deter reliably any threats. One such
priority is a “search for ways of most efficient use of
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military hardware . . . in conditions of limited resources,
first of all, financial and economic.”52 With the April 3,
2006, publication of a new MoD policy statement, “The
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” Baluyevsky
confirmed this shift. President Putin also stressed the
possibility of asymmetrical responses in his address to
the nation on May 10, 2006.53
This approach echoes the strategy of “realistic
deterrence,” which was introduced initially in the
1990s. The concept signaled Russia’s acknowledgement
of its limited financial resources and force capabilities.
“Realistic deterrence” implies abandonment of an
orientation towards the preservation of military
balance through quantitative parity in weapons, instead
reserving the right to respond to any aggressive acts
by all possible means. According to Russia’s National
Security Concept (2000), the country is giving priority
to diplomatic, political, economic, and nonforce
methods in crisis- and conflict-prevention operations.
However, the state reserves the right to use military
force unilaterally if the combination of nonmilitary
threats to national security is considered unacceptably
dangerous.54
In other words, the principle of realistic deterrence
accepts the possibility of becoming engaged in a
military conflict both through an escalating pattern and
through one’s inadequate or asymmetrical response
(for instance, a unilateral strike as a response to a nonnuclear threat to the existence of the nation).55 This
approach is based on a new understanding of how
the state should maintain its influence in vital areas
by changing the nature of its presence, for example,
from physical deployment to monitoring a security
space through intelligence networks; by keeping
open the option of upgrading its military presence in
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“zones of influence”; and by adopting a new policy
in relations with local communities. This approach
represents an attempt by defense and security forces
to address structurally the threats and challenges of
the 21st century with adequate means and at the same
time to optimize the costs of national security and
defense postures. Two factors define the posture that
RF strategic deterrence could assume—new weapon
acquisitions and external weapon developments. Let’s
discuss each in turn:
1. New Weapon Acquisitions. Russia will retain
its nuclear triad of land-based ICBMs, sea-based
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
airborne strategic missiles that can deliver a nuclear
attack from land, sea, or air without relying on third
countries. The nuclear programs have had 100 percent
funding support from the government in the last 2 years,
although some technical problems were encountered
in transferring funds originally allocated to the MoD
and other services to the nuclear enterprises. Russia is
planning to complete the modernization of its strategic
deterrent components by 2015-20. It plans to deploy
up to 2,000 nuclear warheads as allowed within the
existing arms control treaties with the United States,
in line with the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT). SORT requires that both
sides reduce their nuclear stockpiles to 1,700-2,200
warheads by December 31, 2012.
Russia’s sea- and land-based missile groups would
be reequipped by 2015, and the Strategic Missile
Forces would then have 2,000 warheads. After 2015,
the Strategic Missile Forces would be able to operate
“efficiently and without further modernization” until
2045, according to RF official statements. Russia is
planning to maintain the SORT-approved number
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of warheads, even though decommissioning its SS18 Satans. Its SS-19 Stilettos are being replaced every
year by single-warhead silo-based, road-mobile
RT-2PM2 Topol-Ms. Two new missiles, the groundlaunched Topol-M (SS-27) and the sea-launched Bulava30 (SS-NX-30) ICBMs, can carry from three to six
warheads. Moreover, news media reports have cited
Moscow’s recent disclosure of a six-warhead multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
Bulava. It was designed as part of Russia’s effort to
implement the Memorandum to START I (expiring
in 2009). The news reports suggest that the number of
MIRVs per missile was likely to grow to 10 in the near
future.56
According to the designers, the missiles are based
on totally different principles and technology than
were previous systems and are impossible to track or
intercept by available antimissile systems. Moscow is
convinced that it would take other countries 10-15 years
to design ICBMs similar to Russia’s Topol-M (SS-27)
and Bulava-30 (SS-NX-30). The RF strategic component
being built is based on a missile unification principle
which makes the use of nuclear missile capabilities
more flexible and financially efficient in production.
Unification of the missiles generated savings up to 3040 percent (or up to 12-15 billion rubles) in R&D and
testing. The cost inflation rate in producing this new
type of missile is 1.95 percent annually, about the same
as the standard inflation rate 1.93 percent for industry
as a whole, according to the industrial production
index.57
Production of the Topol-M missile was started
in 2006. Despite some concern expressed by defense
experts about the low rate of production of the missiles
and their delivery systems,58 deputy head of the newly
established Military-Industrial Committee Putilin
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confirmed that measures are being taken to speed up
the production cycle.59 Presently Russia has five missile
regiments equipped with silo-based Topol-M missiles.
Also, the first regiment equipped with mobile Topol-M
systems will enter operational service in 2006.
Last year Russia conducted successful launch tests
of the Bulava SLBM, a submarine-launched version
of the Topol-M (SS-27).60 While the tests will continue
until the end of the year, the new delivery systems
are already under production. Fourth-generation
submarines will be armed with the Bulava SLBM.61
Several new Borey-class nuclear submarines are being
built or planned for future construction at the Sevmash
plant in the Archangelsk region. The first one, the
Yury Dolgorukiy, was commissioned in 2006 and is
expected to enter active service by the end of 2008.
The Alexander Nevsky is to be commissioned in 2007
and is planned to be in service in 2009; the Vladimir
Monomakh is expected to be commissioned in 2008 and
to be in service by 2010. The MoD also has continued
the process of modernizing older systems. For instance,
the Topol ICBM was modernized, tested on November
29, 2005, and reentered service with a life expectancy
of 23 years. After modernization, seven submarines
were returned to service with the Northern Fleet (12th
Squadron).
Special attention has been given to building a
Russian system of global navigation (GLONASS) that
would provide more reliability than even the U.S.controlled global-positioning system.62 It currently has
12 operational satellites of the 24 ultimately required.
This year, another six satellites are being sent into orbit.
Moreover, Russia’s system of space-based surveillance
satellites can detect missile launches worldwide. The
space forces will increase their early warning capabili-
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ties with new equipment reportedly enabling Russia’s
early warning system to function without radars based
abroad.63 In addition, according to Colonel General
(Ret.) Victor Yesin, Vice-President of the Academy on
security, defense, and law enforcement and former
head of the main staff of the Strategic Deterrent Forces,
new land-based radar stations are being either built
(with the one at St. Petersburg already in operation)
or planned to be built in Russia proper to reduce its
reliance on the radar network deployed abroad.64
2. External Weapon Developments. Russian experts
believe that if the American missile defense posture
is to be developed within the parameters of the U.S.
Presidential Directive dated December 17, 2002,
the existing and planned Russian nuclear deterrent
capabilities will not be threatened until 2020. The U.S.
missile shield will have limited capabilities, which
would allow Russian missiles to penetrate it. Thus the
U.S. shield would not require additional changes in the
RF response. However, if elements of the U.S. Missile
Defense System are to be deployed along the perimeter
of RF territory, then additional adjustments in the
Russian nuclear deterrent will be required. Moscow
is waiting for an announcement from Washington
on the nature of deployments in Europe (which was
supposed to be clarified in spring 2006). As stated by
Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov during his trip to
Surgut, Russia, on March 23, 2006:
The U.S. administration recently announced plans to
set up a base in Europe as part of its plans to deploy a
global missile shield, and said it would determine the
[receiving] country this spring. Russia will respond
to the deployment of the U.S. missile-defense base in
Europe after it learns about the capabilities of the new
military facility, and the number of missiles deployed
there rather than its location. Only after this Russia will
formulate its response.65
37

Major General Vasilenko, head of the 4th Central
Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, observed
that:
Russia might consider unilateral withdrawal from the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (1987) and
deploy a group of medium range (land-based) missiles
if it must respond to the threats related to nuclear and
missile proliferation, modernization, and upgrading of
the nuclear arsenals . . . belonging to the nuclear club.66

The existing technical and technological capability
and industrial base allow Russia to resume production
of medium-range (1,000-5,500 km) and short-range
(500-1,000km) missiles if a political decision on such
countermeasures is made. Though in 2005-06 the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed
Russia’s adherence to the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Force Treaty, forthcoming developments will
demonstrate whether both states are willing to preserve
Mutual Assured Security (MAS) in the nuclear sphere
as established between the two states after the end of
the Cold War.
Permanent Readiness Forces.
The airborne forces development program for 200610 implies the creation of special-purpose airborne and
air assault units, and mountain rangers. The units are
to differ by the type of equipment, training, and functions. In 2006 the airborne forces started to receive
modern equipment in accordance with the procurement
program for 2006-08 tailored especially for the needs of
the units. First Deputy Minister of Defense Alexander
Belousov stressed that, until the end of 2006, the armed
forces were to receive over 170 modern armored
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vehicles, i.e., 30 T-90 main battle tanks, 40 infantry
combat vehicles, and over 125 armored personnel
carriers (BTR-80 and BTR-90). The air force is to receive
10 new helicopters (Mi-28 and Ka-50). Modernization
of 180 main battle tanks (Т-72, Т-80), 170 armored
personnel carriers, 90 combat vehicles, and 152 aircraft
and helicopters will continue. Most importantly, the
MoD procurement program for the airborne forces for
2006-08 is focused on acquiring high-tech equipment,
including personal theater navigation positioning
systems based on the GLOANASS; night vision goggles;
new combat armored personnel carriers (BND-4); 125
mm artillery pieces (Kord); machine guns (Pecheneg),
etc. According to the MoD, such new equipment allows
Russia to increase combat strength of receiving units
by two-fold.67
DEFENSE SPENDING
Defense spending has doubled in nominal terms
(up 28 percent in real terms) since 2003. Although
official overall spending on national defense is 30
times lower than in the United States, it is difficult
to compare statistical data on defense-oriented
expenditures. Since 2004, each year a different system
for classifying defense expenditures has been presented
to the public and parliament. For instance, the national
defense budget headings in the 2004 state budget
aggregated to 2.56 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). However, the figure excluded data on certain
significant defense-related expenditures (e.g., military
pensions and paramilitary forces), which were funded
outside the national defense budget. If we combine all
data on defense-related expenditures, according to the
IISS assessments, then total defense spending came
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to over 680 billion rubles, or 4.05 percent of GDP.68
The presentation format of the 2005 national defense
budget was changed due to the major structural reform
of the RF government in 2004. As a result, under the
new budget classification system, all defense-related
expenditures were combined in a dedicated chapter
on national defense, which contained an itemization of
funds for R&D, maintenance of current equipment, and
procurement of new equipment for both the MoD and
paramilitary forces, etc. There were several innovations
in the presentation format of the 2006 national defense
budget. The itemization principle of the previous year
was abandoned, although the classified portion of
funds transferred to the MoD (183.1 billion rubles out
of 497.7 billion) and the 666 billion total allocated for
all defense-related purposes was published.
Despite such impediments to budgetary clarity,
there are several obvious trends in defense spending
worth mentioning. In 2004, for the first time since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the funds allocated
for internal defense equalled or exceeded the amount
received for military exports. Defense expenditures in
2006 grew to 1.3 times the figure for 2005. In 2006, the
sum of federal defense orders exceeded profits from
military hardware sales abroad, i.e., $8 billion against
$6 billion, according to Andrey Belianinov, newly
appointed head of the Federal Custom Service and
former director of the Federal Defense Order Service.69
During the last several years, national defense
expenditures have increased on the order of 25-to-30
percent annually. In 2005 and 2006, although substantial
attention was given to routine modernization of
existing equipment, one of the priorities of future
defense reform is more focussed on intensive technical
modernization of the RF armed forces as a whole.
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The goal is to increase the percentage spent on
R&D and procurement as opposed to personnel. In
the past, 70 percent of defense spending went to fund
personnel and only 30 percent went for procurement.
For instance, in 2004 the personnel-to-procurement
spending ratio was 63-37 percent; in 2005, 61-39
percent; in 2006, 60-40 percent. The targeted goal is to
reach 50-50 for “procurement” relative to “personnel
support.” Specifically, the RF Security Council in
2004 established the goal of “optimizing” budget
appropriations through 2010-11 by achieving the 50-50
ratio.70
The structure of the procurement budget was
transformed as well. Until 2005, funds allocated to
operational equipment were transferred mainly into
R&D. In 2005 and 2006, however, the MoD and security
services are starting to receive actual deliveries from the
procurement projects, not just single items but complex
deliveries of equipment kits. At a press conference on
March 28, 2006, Minister of Defense Ivanov pointed
out that the MoD and the services finally had started
to commission new equipment in substantial volumes.
From 2000 until 2005, the MoD commissioned only 40
items of equipment, but in 2005 its commissioned list
grew to over 400 items.71 However, this data should
be tempered by the fact that the Russian MoD had
been greatly underfunded in procurement, which
led in the last decade to the aging of the majority of
equipment, with only 20 percent of all equipment in
the MoD service being new. In comparison, 70 percent
of Western military equipment kits are new.72 Serial
production and deliveries of military equipment to the
Russian armed forces should be in full bloom by 2010.
The state defense order for 2007 was taken under
consideration (first reading) by the Military-Industrial

41

Commission (MIC) on May 19, 2006, with a second
reading expected on June 2, 2006 (postponed). Defense
spending is projected to increase by 27-28 percent in
general in comparison with 2006, not just 20 percent
as originally announced.73 The MoD’s 2007 order estimated a need for 302.7 billion rubles to cover equip-ment
procurement, repair, and R&D. Procurement programs
of weapons and military equipment are to increase by
22 percent; spending on repairs is to rise by 15 percent;
and funding of R&D is to rise by 20 percent. The MoD is
planning to spend the equivalent of over 10 billion U.S.
dollars for these purposes in 2007. Despite the lower
projections announced earlier, Defense Minister Ivanov
said that the next year’s procurement budget would
rise by 27-28 percent. At the session of the State Duma
on defense reform, he stated that spending on national
defense was to exceed $29.6 billion (U.S.). Western
military experts assessed the newly provided statistical
data cautiously. For example. Dr. Stephen Blank of the
U.S. Army War College made this assessment: “While
[the new higher figures] might result from inflationary
pressures for raw materials, it might also suggest that
the lack of transparency in Russian defense spending
is growing.”74
The acquisition programs did cover nuclear and
non-nuclear items, contrary to the assessments of some
western scholars.75 On May 18, 2006, First Deputy
Minister of Defense Alexander Belousov stated that the
RF armed forces received more than 170 items in 2006.
The naval procurement program was revived with
several important projects commissioned, including
stealth technologies.76 However, despite the substantial
increase in funding, the volume of the state defense
order in shipbuilding and vessel-building is still 100
times less than the comparable figure for U.S. Navy
programs.
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There are 146 types of weapons and weapon
systems being designed and adopted for industrial
production to meet the needs of the MoD. According
to MIC Deputy Head Putilin, an additional 415 items
of military hardware successfully passed the testing,
and another 409 items passed the initial testing phase.77
The MoI and internal forces budget for procurement
programs is expected to increase by one billion rubles
in 2007. The Security Services budget for procurement
programs is to increase by 5 billion rubles in 2007.78
Additional funding is to be provided for counterterrorist operations and law enforcement activities in
“conflict/hot spots” across the country. Presently, the
acquisition programs are implemented on the basis
of a 3-year plan. On April 26, 2006, the State Budget
Commission adopted in principle the defense funding
parameters for 2007-09. The state procurement program
extending to 2015 is expected to be adopted in the
second half of 2006.
In the course of implementation of the Federal
Defense Order, several problems were revealed that
triggered intervention of the RF government:
• Increasing costs of the procurement programs
due to the existing mechanism for pricing,
commissioning, and implementing the defense
projects. The government demonstrated limited
ability to regulate the pricing mechanisms on
the defense procurement projects. Problems
were registered with the limited efficiency of
the defense enterprises and the irregular flow
of financing from the Ministry of Defence to
defense enterprises.
• Devaluation of export contracts occurred due
to the internal competition of the defense
enterprises for military export orders.
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• The state of aged equipment and the technological base of defense enterprises has considerably
degraded in the last 15-20 years in the absence of
substantial financial investments in the defense
industrial sector.
As a result, the RF government took several ameliorative steps:
• A new mechanism for commissioning procurement projects and monitoring their delivery was
introduced. As part of this process, the MilitaryIndustrial Commission was established as we
saw earlier.
• A decision was made to accelerate the creation
of vertical holding companies as avenues for
reforming the defense industry.
• A new approach to funding defense projects
was introduced; the Public Private Partnership
(PPP) principles allowed the government to
rely on business support in its plans of defense
modernization.
Reforming the Defense Industry.
According to Stanislav Puginsky, Deputy Head of
the Federal Agency on Industry (Rostcom), completion
of the reforms of the military-industrial complex
is expected by 2010. The main concern of the RF
government and MoD officials has been the ability of
the defense industry to deliver both the expanding
military export contracts and internal state defense
orders on time. An analysis of industry reform plans
revealed that the government has abandoned the old
practice of preserving specialized labor forces as a
means of holding the country’s military-industrial
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complex together. The current focus is on establishing
technologically competitive and financially efficient
corporations that can swiftly deliver the needed
product to the consumer.
The reform of the defense industry is to stimulate
mergers and acquisitions among the presently existing
579 state-owned enterprises and 428 shareholding
firms of the defense complex. The reforms aim to
trigger needed bankruptcy declarations, closures
of some enterprises, and mergers of others. It is
believed that approximately 46 percent of the existing
enterprises could survive the reforms and be formed
into 40-45 integrated holdings with potential options
for further consolidation of assets. Integrated holdings
are envisioned in aviation, shipping, automobile,
radioelectronics, information technology, tank building, etc.
In 2005–06, a detailed feasibility study took place of
the efficiency and possibility of cooperation among 600
enterprises traditionally involved in nuclear missile
procurement programs. In the last few months, the
senior management personnel of several dozens of
defense enterprises were changed. A directing staff,
with 20 and more years of experience, was ordered to
retire, while new appointments were made with the
aim of bringing fresh blood into the system. The new
management is expected to be free from any sentimental
attachments to the firms they were put in charge of so
as to be able to introduce such needed but unpopular
measures as personnel cuts, bankruptcy declarations,
etc.
In his national address on May 10, 2006, President
Putin called for the swift creation of holding companies
in aviation/space and shipbuilding/vessel-building
sectors. On the next day, he expressed interest in
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creating such holdings by the end of 2006. The RF
government is emphasizing creation of specialized
holdings in aviation, shipbuilding, information
technology, communications, etc., where PPP
principles of combining state funding and business
initiatives are to contribute to the swift revival of
national industry and the military-industrial complex.
For instance, a proposed aviation holding company,
like the United Aircraft Construction Corporation, is
to have different levels of engagement of private and
state sectors in military and civilian R&D.79 The level
of state involvement in the military sector is to be no
less than 75 percent; in transport and special-purpose
aviation, it is to be around 51 percent; and in civil
aviation projects, no more than 25 percent.
Rosoboronexport, created by the merger of
Rosvooruzheniye and Promexport in November 2000, is
to oversee the process of creating holding companies.
Rosoboronexport already has experience in the creation
and consolidation of helicopter firms as embodied in
Oboronprom, a Rosoboronexport subsidiary. As part of the
defense industry reforms, Rosoboronexport is scheduled
to be transformed into a state corporation. The firm
will continue to act as one of the main facilitators in
establishing specialized vertical holding companies.
Rosoboronexport (with a budget grown to $6.1 billion
and a portfolio worth over $20 billion) has not only
been coordinating arms export deals but, from 2002
onward, started investing in the domestic defense
sector by creating incentives for specialized holdings.
Recent examples of such holdings are the following:
Oboronprom, which Rosoboronexport established through
acquisitions and mergers of helicoptor producers, and
the automobile-building holding company, AvtoVaz,
which Rosoboronexport acquired by buying a controlling
interest and installing its own management team. The
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next goal is creation of a shipbuilding holding company
(the priority firms for acquisition are Severnaya Verf
and Baltiyskiy Zavod).80
In sectors where vertical integrated holdings have
not yet been set up, the mechanism of additional state
oversight over foreign defense orders was introduced.
In accordance with the Presidential decree titled “On
Military and Technical Cooperation between Russia
and Foreign States,” dated September 2005, the Federal
Military and Technical Service (headed by Mikhael
Dmitriev) was given the right to appoint managers to
execute export contracts, approvals of which are based
on collective decisions.
Additional Sources of Financing.
There is overall support for increasing defenseoriented spending in Russia. The debates in the
parliament have shown that MPs supported the
allocation of more than one-third of the state budget
to defense needs. Some MPs such as Viktor Ozerov,
Chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security
of the Upper Chamber, are keen to use nonbudgetary
financial means for military procurement, for example,
financing some of the military procurement projects
from the Stabilization Fund. However, for the time
being any attempts to channel Stabilization Fund
reserves into the defense sphere have been rejected by
the government. On May 12, 2006, First Deputy Prime
Minister Medvedev stated that the Stabilization Fund
was not planned to be used for such national programs
as defense/security.
On May 10, 2006, the address to the nation by
President Putin revealed only the main outline of the
government’s elaborate plans for the defense sector.
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There is an intent to combine tighter state control with
liberalization of domestic investment opportunities by
introducing PPP principles in rebuilding the state’s
industry and reforming the defense/security complex.
Funding for the modernization of the armed forces
and services is to come from a variety of sources and
through several channels. The main influx of funds to
the national budget is expected to come from customs
and new taxing regulations, at least in 2007-09. The
funds are not to be transferred directly to the national
defense budget, but implementation of certain social
and economic development programs is to benefit the
general “environment” for implementation of the state
defense order. Several of the measures contemplated
are discussed here in greater detail:
• Customs. In May 2006 the RF President ordered
the government to reintroduce direct control
over customs, given up in 2004, to the Ministry
of Economic Development and Trade as a
major channel for increasing state revenues.
The Federal Custom Service (which provides
up to 40 percent of budget revenues) was thus
resubordinated directly to the government. In
addition, the Federal Custom Service was given
the authority to formulate norms and regulations
covering foreign economic activity. Its head
is responsible for appointing and discharging
the heads of regional departments and custom
offices, although the deputy head is appointed
directly by the government. Andrey Belyaninov,
former head of Rosoboronexport and a close
associate of President Putin, was appointed
head of the Federal Custom Service on May
11, 2006. As part of the reform initiative, the
private custom checkpoints, which previously
functioned on some borders, were closed.
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• Arms Sales. Moscow introduced the practice
of prepaid agreements for future arms export
deals. On May 13, 2006, First Deputy Prime
Minister Ivanov announced that Russia was
abandoning the practice of selling its military
hardware on credit or in exchange for promised
future incentives and paybacks.
• State Control. The government announced
plans to increase its role in sectors of the
economy associated with national resources
and industry, while creating favorable
conditions for private investment. Measures
proposed include establishment of industrial
holding companies and creation of rubledenominated commodity exchanges for oil, gas,
gold, etc.
More specifically, on May 10, 2006, speaking
before both chambers of parliament, cabinet
members, and reporters, President Putin
proposed setting up ruble-denominated oil and
natural gas commodity exchanges in Moscow.
The feasibility of the proposal was established
by several business teams with the participation
of Western partners during the early months
of 2006. Particularly, increased dividends are
expected to be received from sales on the oil
exchange. Preparations are to be completed by
the end of 2006, with full functioning to begin
in early 2007. According to Russian experts,
Russian companies lose up to $5-6 billion per
year on sales of Urals oil on foreign commodity
exchanges due to existing pricing mechanisms.
The changes will increase the price of the Urals
oil on the world markets. A radical innovation
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will be the opening of access to pipelines not
only to the oil companies but to traders as well.
		

This initiative is to be followed by a creation of
a gas commodity exchange. As part of the new
EU-RF energy charter, the EU purchases of gas
on the Russian exchange could serve as quid
pro quo for Russia’s grant of access to its gas
pipelines to foreign traders, as demanded by the
EU. This idea received support from Alexander
Dvorkin, Head of the Exports Department in
the Presidential administration on May 12,
2006. It was announced formally that the gas
commodity exchange would start operation
within these parameters as early as June 2006.
Russia is planning to follow the trend (initiated
by Iran and China) of transferring the bulk of
operations in the energy and metals exchanges
from “customer” to “producer” markets.

• “Social” Tax on Business. This tax is expected to
be introduced without formal legislation. The
government expects to reap a concrete financial
return as entrepreneurs become motivated to
participate in the main economic development
programs.
• Public Private Partnership as a Legal Base. The
government is taking steps to ease the process
for private capital investments in the defense
sector. For instance, the government has sought
new legislation that would allow it to shortcut
the decisionmaking process of private/foreign
investment in the defense and security sector
without referring such matters for presidential
consent. Such a shortcut would be granted
only if the proposed investment amounts to as
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much as 25-30 percent of the target enterprise.
A draft of new legislation titled “On the Order
of Investment in Commercial Enterprises That
Have Strategic Importance for National Security
of the Russian Federation,” was expected to go
to the Ministry of Industry and Energy and
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
for consideration by early June 2006. This new
legislation will redefine the term “strategic
enterprise,” formerly applied primarily to
organizations that either are involved in
implementation of the state defense order, or
have the authority to import and export military
or dual-use technologies and products. As of May
2006, however, the government will reconstrue
the meaning of “strategic enterprise” so as to
keep the decision on applying PPP in the military
industrial complex out of the hands of the MoD
and the military/defense establishment.81 The
purpose is to avoid overemphasizing defense
orders in the overall industrial revival plans.
• Foreign Currencies. On July 1, 2006, a half-year
before the scheduled date, Russia suspended all
restrictions on the internal movement of foreign
currencies. The suspension was for the purpose
of making the Russian domestic market more
attractive to foreign and private investors. Such
measures were introduced to coincide with
forthcoming initial public offerings (IPOs) of
shares of Russian companies on domestic and
foreign stock exchanges, thus opening up for
trading shares of oil and gas firms, etc.
• Energy Prices. Russian experts count on rising
worldwide energy prices resulting from the
growing demands for energy supplies in North
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America, the EU, China, and India as well as
possible energy shortages ensuing from the
confrontation between Iran and the United
States over Iran’s noncompliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSE/MILITARY
Establishment of civilian control over the military
is an essential part of defense reform. Russian scholars
make a clear distinction between “political,” “civilian,”
and “parliamentary” control over the military. It is
strongly believed in the RF that not every country is
ready and prepared to exercise an identical level of
control over the military, and that the state of affairs
in specific states and societies should be correlated
to the respective mechanisms of control. Vladislav
Cheban, a former military strategist, has taken the
position that civil control does not mean civilian, or
nonmilitary, as such, but rather that the state’s control
over the military and security services is manifested
by having military or personnel from other national
services monitoring the activities of the MoD and
other security services in their role as citizens with
special professional knowledge and understanding
of the sensitive nature of information and respect for
secrecy.82 This interpretation of a “proper pattern” for
civil-military relations came about as a result of events
Russia experienced after the collapse of the USSR.
Parliamentary Control.
Parliament is conceived to provide a legal basis for
the armed forces in combatting contemporary threats
and implementing defense reform. Accordingly,
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the RF parliament passed such federal laws as “On
Emergency and Military Rule” and “On Defense,” plus
other federal laws regulating the actions of the armed
forces, special forces, and law enforcement agencies.
Laws also were adopted regulating the activity of the
military-industrial complex. In November 2004, after
parliamentary hearings, the Federation Council of the
RF invited the executive branch to participate jointly
with the members of parliament in formulating and
drafting over 30 laws, including those titled “On the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” “On Military
Construction of the Russian Federation,” “On the
State Defense Order,” and “On Military Navy Bases.”
In 2005, the State Duma adopted 14 laws related to
defense and security.83
However, some of the new laws could not be
implemented properly because they left certain
loopholes for violations or misinterpretation. For
instance, issues like responsibility for executing the
state defense order or guarantees for social security
of servicemen were not addressed adequately by the
new regulations. Particularly serious adjustments are
needed to the federal law “On Mobilization Training
and Mobilization in the RF.” Parliament has not
always been successful in persuading the government
to introduce long overdue legislation increasing civil
control over the military. For instance, since 2000, the
Russian government has stalled consideration of the
draft federal law “On the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation,” mentioned above, by the State Duma.84
Some defense experts draw attention to the weak
role played by legislators in the implementation of
defense reform, e.g., failure to exercise parliamentary
control over the budgeting process. But it is difficult
for parliament to monitor and assess defense-related
data. Some data is not released to the MPs at all, and
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some data is classified, especially as to costs and the
efficiency of procurement programs. The monitoring
job is difficult in the absence of long-term publicly
announced procurement plans, which are essential
for determining the relative efficiency of defense
spending. There is no stable, regularized taxonomy for
the defense spending and procurement document sent
forward for parliamentary assessment. Continual yearto-year changes in budgetary categories have been the
rule for national defense budget expenditures since
2004.
The Public Chamber.
Pervasive dissatisfaction with the efficiency of the
Russian parliament has led the government to create
the Public Chamber as an important element of civil
control. The main formal task of the Chamber is to
monitor how state institutions comply with existing
law and provide a channel for “bottom up” suggestions
for new laws. For instance, The Public Chamber’s
commission on public control over law enforcement
institutions (Chair Anatoly Kucherena) has held
sessions on the subject of bullying in the armed forces.
On April 14, 2006, the Commission held hearings on
hazing in the army as well as public/civil control of
the military.
On other occasions, the Public Chamber has acted
as a test bed for new policies being considered by
the authorities. For instance, the Chamber suggested
adoption of a new law that would require legal
limitations on applicants for civil service managerial
positions in the executive or legislative bodies, e.g.,
disqualification of any person who deliberately
avoided serving in the military. It remains to be seen
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whether this initiative, condemned by Human Rights
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin on April 20, 2006, will be
translated into law.
Independent Judicial System.
An independent judiciary is still in the process of
realization. However, revelations of hazing in the army
have relevance to the matter. Chief Military Prosecutor
Alexander Savenkov publicly confronted Minister
of Defence Ivanov at a session of the Main Military
Prosecution Office (MPO) in May 2005. He blamed the
Minister personally for inept handling of the “Ulman’s
court case” in the North Caucasus and for appointing
former Commanding Officer of the Northern Fleet
Gennady Suchkov as an adviser to the Minister of
Defense. The public controversy continued into 2006.
On February 15, 2006, the Minister of Defense, in
turn, blamed the MPO for the high level of unsolved
crimes in the military. Among 20,390 registered crimes
and incidents, he claimed the MPO managed to close
only 153 cases (0.75 percent). The arguments between
the MoD and MPO demonstrate the RF General
Prosecution Office’s support of MPO efforts to make
the investigative mechanisms within the military more
effective and to introduce new channels of professional
and public scrutiny. The establishment of MoD-MPO
joint working groups in military units can be taken as
a measure of support for law and order within military
units. In the most troublesome units, these groups are
to function on a permanent basis.
Financial Monitoring and Audit.
Defense spending has increased three-fold since
2000. On the one hand, the funds provided exceed
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spending on national health care and education before
these areas were named as national federal priority
programs for development. On the other hand, the
funding provided is not enough to implement the type
of reform espoused publicly. The rise in the amount
spent in the last few years in procurement programs
did not result, in some cases, in an increase in the
amount of equipment delivered to the armed forces.
The spending increase was due both to inflation
and to the decision of the enterprises to submit a
much higher bill to the MoD and other services for
commissioned procurement orders. This frustrating
situation triggered a decision by the political/military
authorities to order an independent audit of defense
procurement programs. Since 2004, the Federal Audit
Chamber has been investigating such procurement
programs and possible misuse of state defense funds.
These investigations have resulted in several highlevel convictions on charges involving corruption and
misuse of funds.
Presidential Control.
As part of administrative reform in 2004, the power
structures were subordinated directly to the President.
In order to overcome the institutional autonomy of the
military, particularly as expressed in the ministerial
opposition to reforms dealing with corruption
within the defense and security establishment, the
Presidential administration is enforcing vigorous
personal presidential control over the military/defense
and security establishment. Though there already
was a tradition of strong presidential control over the
military85 in Russia, the present phase properly can be
characterized as an attempt to put the FSB under tight
presidential control. Two measures will illustrate:
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• The personnel policy in the Federal Security
Service (FSB) has been under presidential control
since December 2005 (including the numerical
strength of the service).86
• First made public in September 2005,87 an
independent investigative unit within the
Ministry of Justice has been created, but it
is subordinated directly to the President. It
has the specific functions of monitoring and
investigating any violations of regulations and/
or corruption charges brought against personnel
in the power block ministries (siloviki). The first
results of the investigative work of the unit
were revealed in May 2006, when high-ranking
officials in the FSB, counterterrorist units, MoI,
Customs, and the Prosecution Office were
dismissed from their positions on charges of
corruption and criminal activity.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of current developments in Russian
defense reform shows that, despite a very slow and
rocky start extending even to the present, defense
reform is happening steadily, although still very slowly.
Elements of the reform “road map” are indeed being
implemented when conditions are conducive. Marked
change can be expected to be visible by 2008-10, when
the Russian defense and security establishment will
review results of progress in professionalizing member
institutions. This is the period when serial deliveries
from the procurement programs are expected to reach
the armed forces and services. That is also the time
when a transfer of military functions from the Military
Districts to strategic directions and operational task
forces is envisioned.
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Meanwhile, the current phase of defense reform
can be considered as transitional. Nevertheless, it
affects all elements of the state’s defense and security
systems. Current Russian defense reform provides
new windows of opportunity for the U.S. armed forces
regarding cooperation/links/contacts with their
Russian counterparts. For example:
• As a re-MIRVing program for Russian strategic
nuclear forces becomes a reality, it might
become essential to “revisit” the arms control
agenda. As part of the package, both militaries
could exchange views on prolonging the START
regime.
• With expanding energy cooperation between the
two nations, the task of securing deliveries and
storage facilities could be shifted to the armed
forces as a possible opportunity for combined
missions. As the Russian military is given new
missions in securing offshore energy facilities
and maritime transportation corridors, the U.S.
armed forces might well be interested in the
possibilities of increased cooperation with the
Russians, or at least in making space monitoring
of maritime transportation routes more transparent. New options for naval cooperation
could be seen as part of the energy security
framework, or as extended missions under the
New Proliferation Initiative mandate.
• In Russian defense industries, it might become
essential to explore new opportunities provided
by the restructuring of Russia’s defense
enterprises and creation of holding companies
performing R&D and producing civil, dual-use
military equipment as part of their portfolios.
The possibility of participation in the PPP
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projects (joint integrating holdings) should be
considered seriously, especially in view of the
potential deals already made or forthcoming
between Russian companies and European,
Chinese, and other foreign firms.
• Consideration should be given to enhancing
contacts between national special-purpose
forces, joint training/exercises, and short-term
exchange programs, since special-purpose
forces/peacekeeping units should be seen
as specially selected preferential partners for
cooperation with the U.S./NATO forces in
“out-of-area” operations. However, it should
be acknowledged that Russian armed forces are
going to be employed internally with expanded
“policing” functions.
In addition to contacts between the U.S.-RF armed
forces, defense reform opens additional opportunities
for legislative contacts between the corresponding
committees of the Russian Parliament and the U.S.
Congress. It might be useful to consider the possibility
of reopening the exchange program for members of the
parliamentary/congressional committees’ staffs. Such
a program could help to establish long-term contacts
between the two legislative bodies and stabilize
channels of communications on issues related to the
public debates on bilateral defense and security issues.
These are some of the opportunities that conceivably
could arise as Russian defense reforms progress. But
whatever course bilateral military relations between
Moscow and Washington take, American analysts and
officials should understand that, while Russian defense
policy may not have been of consuming interest or
importance in the recent past, it is certainly so today.
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A new, improved Russian military establishment is
arising, and it demands to be taken seriously both as
an object of analysis and of policy.
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